1
1
Key Takeaway: Epic Games Store just hired a new leader, Martin Keely, who previously ran Blizzard’s Battle.net launcher. Despite record revenue in 2025, Epic still holds only ~3% of the PC gaming market compared to Steam’s 74%. Keely’s challenge: make Epic’s store "sticky" enough that players stay after grabbing free games.
On July 27, 2026, Epic Games announced a leadership change at its PC game storefront. Martin Keely—who spent seven years as the senior vice president running Blizzard’s Battle.net launcher—is now the VP and General Manager of Epic Games Store and Epic Online Services.
He replaces Steve Allison, who led the store since its December 2018 launch and left earlier that month to join Saber Interactive (the studio behind World War Z and Warhammer 40,000: Space Marine 2).
Why This Matters: This isn’t just a routine executive swap. Epic has spent billions of dollars and seven years trying to break Steam’s stranglehold on PC gaming. The new boss inherits a store with growing revenue but a market share that barely moves.
Martin Keely isn’t new to the launcher game. For seven years, he was the top executive overseeing Battle.net—Blizzard’s PC platform that hosts games like:
| Aspect | Battle.net Under Keely | Epic Games Store (Historically) |
|---|---|---|
| Player Sentiment | "A launcher people tolerate" | "A launcher people resent" |
| Community Tools | Strong (friends, chat, matchmaking) | Lacking for years |
| Retention | Organic (players log in for games) | Relies heavily on free giveaways |
The Bet: Epic is betting Keely’s experience building a launcher people actually use daily will transfer to fixing Epic’s "sticky" problem.
When announcing his move on LinkedIn, Keely said he was "excited to get started with the team delivering new capabilities that elevate player, creator and developer experiences." That "player" mention is notable—Epic’s pitch has historically focused on developers (via its 12% commission), not player experience.
Steve Allison wasn’t pushed out; he left for a new job. In July 2026, he joined Saber Interactive as their new CEO.
Allison’s Legacy at Epic:
His Parting Promise: In January 2026, Allison publicly committed to bringing Epic Games Store to Microsoft’s next Xbox console on "day one." Whether Keely honors that specific timeline remains an open question.
Despite the market share problem, the business metrics look genuinely good:
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Store Revenue | $950M | $1.09B | $1.16B | +6% YoY |
| Third-Party Player Spending | Not disclosed | $250M | $400M | +57% YoY |
| Monthly Active Users (Avg) | ~62M | ~65M | 67M | Steady growth |
| Peak Monthly Users (Dec) | — | — | 78M | Holiday bump |
| Registered PC Accounts | — | — | ~295M | Cumulative total |
The Good News: Revenue is up, third-party spending (money on games Epic doesn’t publish) jumped 57%, and user numbers keep climbing.
The Bad News: None of this has moved Epic’s market share needle.
Steam (Valve) still controls ~74% of global PC digital game distribution by revenue. That figure has barely shifted since Epic launched in 2018.
Think of it like this: Switching costs are incredibly high.
Steam isn’t standing still either. In the first half of 2026, Steam posted $11.1 billion in revenue, up 14.5% year-over-year. Valve keeps improving the product while Epic tries to catch up.
Epic’s core pitch to developers: "We only take 12% vs. Steam’s 30%." But commission rate alone hasn’t moved players.
| Platform | Launch | Standard Commission | Est. 2026 Market Share | Key Differentiator |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Steam (Valve) | 2003 | 30% → 25% ($10M+) → 20% ($50M+) | ~74% | Largest library, social, Workshop mods |
| Epic Games Store | 2018 | 12% flat | ~3% | Lowest commission, free weekly games |
| GOG (CD Projekt) | 2008 | ~30% | <2% | DRM-free, no launcher required |
| Microsoft Store (PC) | 2012 | 12% (matched Epic in 2021) | <2% | Xbox Play Anywhere cross-buy |
The Puzzle: Both Epic and Microsoft undercut Steam by 18 percentage points, yet neither has dented Valve’s share. Price isn’t the product—habit is.
Epic never hid that the store would lose money early. The question: how long is "early"?
| Year | Store Revenue | Third-Party Spending | Notable Development |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | Launch (Dec) | N/A | No cart, no reviews at launch |
| 2023 | $950M | Not disclosed | Court filings: >$700M cumulative losses |
| 2024 | $1.09B | $250M | Growth continues, share flat |
| 2025 | $1.16B | $400M (+57%) | Record year; Allison departs July 2026 |
| 2026 | Not yet reported | Not yet reported | Keely named VP/GM (July 27) |
Court Revelations: During Epic v. Apple, filings showed the store lost $590M+ from 2019–2021. Epic’s own projections estimated ~$965M cumulative losses by 2027.
The Trade-off: Epic spends billions on exclusivity deals and free games to buy users. The hope: eventually, the store becomes profitable. That "eventually" keeps getting pushed back.
Epic gives away free games every week. It works for getting accounts created—but not for keeping people.
Battle.net Never Needed This: Players logged in daily for WoW, Overwatch, Diablo. Epic has Fortnite—but Fortnite lives partly outside the Epic launcher on many platforms.
Keely’s First Big Decision: Does he keep ramping free-game spending, or shift that budget to product features (reviews, cloud saves, social tools) that make people want to stay?
Allison’s pledge: "We definitely plan to be on the new hardware for Xbox… on day one."
The Context: Microsoft’s next console (rumored to be a hybrid PC-console device) may open the door to multiple PC storefronts running natively on Xbox hardware for the first time ever.
If this happens:
Keely hasn’t confirmed the "day one" commitment yet. Silence = worth watching.
Epic Games Store launched bare-bones and has played catch-up for years:
| Missing/Weak Feature | Added? | Years Behind Steam |
|---|---|---|
| Shopping cart | (eventually) | 2+ years |
| User reviews | (late) | 3+ years |
| Cloud saves | Partial | Ongoing |
| Wishlist → purchase tools | Weak | Ongoing |
| Community forums/activity feeds | Minimal | Major gap |
| Mod support (like Workshop) | None | Major gap |
The Engineering Challenge: Epic’s resources are split across Fortnite, Unreal Engine, Epic Online Services, and the store. Keely must fight for engineering investment.
Epic Games Store wasn’t just a business—it was Exhibit A in Epic’s antitrust crusade:
The Irony: Epic won the legal argument on mobile (proving lower commissions + competition work) but hasn’t won the market argument on PC.
Now Steam faces its own lawsuit: A certified class-action by ~32,000 developers over Valve’s 30% commission and price-parity rules. If Steam is forced to change, that could reshape the landscape more than anything Epic does.
Feature parity over further discounting.
Expect Keely to prioritize reviews, cloud saves, social tools—not cutting below 12%.
Market share stays single-digit through 2027.
Structural switching costs are too high. A jump past 5% is unlikely without a console breakthrough.
Next-Xbox day-one plan proceeds—cautiously.
If Microsoft’s hybrid strategy holds, Epic will be there, but maybe with a narrower launch catalog.
Giveaway spending growth slows.
Third-party spending is up 57%. Expect incremental budget to shift to product engineering.
| What Happened | Why It Matters | What’s Next |
|---|---|---|
| Martin Keely (ex-Battle.net boss) named Epic Games Store GM | Brings launcher expertise Epic desperately needs | Watch for feature investment vs. giveaway spending |
| 2025: Record revenue ($1.16B), record third-party spend ($400M) | Business is growing healthily | Growth ≠ market share |
| Steam still at 74% share; Epic at ~3% | Switching costs are the real moat | Keely must solve retention, not just acquisition |
| Next Xbox may welcome multiple storefronts | Could be Epic’s first console foothold | Keely’s silence on "day one" pledge is telling |
| Epic still losing money (~$700M+ cumulative) | "Early investment" phase lasting 7+ years | Profitability pushed to late 2020s at earliest |
Bottom Line: Keely is the right type of hire. Whether he gets the resources, time, and organizational support to fix a 7-year feature deficit while fighting a 74% incumbent—that’s the story to watch.
Martin Keely, former Senior VP of Blizzard’s Battle.net launcher (7 years). Named VP & GM of Epic Games Store and Epic Online Services on July 27, 2026.
He left voluntarily in July 2026 to become CEO of Saber Interactive (World War Z, Space Marine 2). He ran Epic Games Store since its 2018 launch.
~3% of global PC digital distribution by revenue. Steam holds ~74%. This gap has barely moved since 2018.
Over $700 million in cumulative losses through 2023 (per court filings). Internal projections estimated ~$965M total losses by 2027.
Steve Allison said "yes, day one." Martin Keely has not confirmed this commitment yet. Depends on Microsoft’s final policies.
No. Most recent disclosures show it still operating at a loss, though revenue and third-party spending grew strongly in 2025.
Article based on reporting from GamesRadar, PC Gamer, Tech Times, PocketGamer.biz, Niche Gamer, Game Developer, Video Games Chronicle, and Game Rant. Financial figures from Epic’s court disclosures and PC Gamer’s 2025 breakdown.